Red:
Without a biological propensity for society, we could not have environmental determination of humanity but also, if there is a degree of commonality, of universality
through biology then some of the enlightenment project may still be valid.This rather reminds me of an article in the latest issue of Critical Review, in which Greg Hill repudiates Rorty's strong relativistic stance (via Wittgenstein's determination) by alleging that Wittgenstein's phrase 'forms of life' means immutable reality common to all, and not (as Rorty alleged) cultural norms predicated by specific practice.* It caught my attention because Hill used the same quote I had presented to Red (in post 3133), which was (and I now add the entire text of the section in question):
Following a rule is analogous to obeying an order. We are trained to do so; we react to an order in a particular way. But what if one person reacts in one way and another in another to the order and the training? Which one is right? Suppose you came as an explorer into an unknown country with a language quite strange to you. In what circumstances would you say that the people there gave orders, understood them, obeyed them, rebelled against them, and so on? The common behavior of mankind is the system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language.(1)
I do not wish to take the position that all behavior in itself is 'relative' to itself, thus denying some standard(s) of universal fixity. Behavior is relative (contingent), to be sure, upon independent variables which we may call fixed ('objective'). If I claimed otherwise, then I would, through an extreme sort of cultural relativity, be asserting that all behavior can be 'cut loose' from measurable factors---which would be mentalism. What I mean is that (left) mentalists (such as Rorty) often insinuate that 'cultural relativity' can dictate what people 'feel' in all cases simply by positing that 'if a culture agrees such-is-such, then it becomes such-is-such.' Behaviorism, predicated upon scientific laws of nature (in this case, the probability of certain behaviors being emitted in the presence of certain reinforcers), respects the concept of a common 'form of life.'
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: it seems to me that Marx grappled with the problem of how and what universal values would emerge as a result of the dissolution of a class society.
Not so fast. If 'universal values' are contingent upon a 'dissolution of a class society,' then it is doubtful that such values are truly universal. Do we speak of 'universal values' emerging as a result of (or because of) class society? Could we say that capitalism is a 'social contract with political obligation based on a valid universality'? Yes, people like Alan Greenspan do so all the time.** We have been at this spot before, of course. You want that 'fairness gene' to work for your ideological beliefs whereas (understandably) other people want that gene to work for their ideological beliefs. What I want is freedom from such reliance altogether. Contingencies, for me, do not need the sanction of 'human nature' any more than they need the sanction of a 'higher authority' (which I believe is what 'human nature' represents today).
: [O]ne of the great unresolved problems confronting "critical theory"...[is]...a need to legitimize a universal, normative behavior.
To replace religion's absolute arbitration...
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On to context.
Wittgenstein asks us to consider what happens when an individual is asked to complete a pattern or an equation (such as 1,3, 5, 7, 9...). What he seeks is the difference between 'Now I understand' and 'Now I can go on.' (Chomsky would insist on the former, of course). In his words:
[I]f 'Now I understand the principle' does not mean the same as 'The formula....occurs to me' (or 'I say the formula,' 'I write it down,' etc.)---does it not follow from this that I employ the sentence 'Now I understand....' or 'Now I can go on' as a description of a process occurring behind or side by side with that of the saying of the formula? If there has to be anything 'behind the utterance of the formula' it is particular circumstances, which justify me in saying I can go on---when the formula occurs to me. Try not to think of understanding as a 'mental process' at all.---For that is the expression which confuses you. But ask yourself: in what sort of case, in what kind of circumstances, do we say, 'Now I know how to go on,' when that is, the formula has occurred to me? In the sense in which there are processes (including mental processes) which are characteristic of understanding, understanding is not a mental process.(2)
'[U]nderstanding is not a mental process.' It is contingent, in other words, upon context. This, of course, is the behaviorist line. Skinner: '[T]he contingencies, not the mind, make discriminations.'(3) What happens when we learn, say, a formula such as 1,3, 5, 7, 9...? Has 'knowledge' been 'acquired' as if a physical entity were acquired? What I believe Wittgenstein is saying is that a repertoire has been changed, that there is no 'knowledge' in the sense of something gained but that all there is is the individual (behavior) which, after exposure to the contingencies '1,3, 5, 7, 9...,' responds differently. I do not see knowledge, I see a changed individual; what has changed the individual has been exposure to (discriminative) contingencies, not exposure to 'knowledge.'
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: [Y]our Utopia 2000 and other examples of 'intentional' communities offer a way out of this dilemma by successfully avoiding [a fixed standard].
I hope I have put to rest any idea that I negate all ideas of fixed standards of behavior; I do question with suspicion those who promote the idea that there are universal, fixed standards of 'values,' however---whether they are Left or Right.
'Threat of a good example.' Why are there are 'Skinnerian' communities but no 'Chomskyite' communities? The mentalists are waiting for 'human nature' to provide them with the 'free will' to change their social environment. As I pointed out before, this is a contradiction; if there is a fixed 'human nature' then 'free will' cannot exist. That is one reason why, I believe, the Left has gone round in round in circles these last few decades (embracing Freud***). As far as how 'far such [communitarian] influence[s] can be expected to reach,' the primary thing is for the 'influence' to reach in the community, not necessarily to 'inspire' or change any outside ones (that would require 'changing' their values). If there were indeed universal values, change would not be very probable...
Change the environment (small-scale communities that establish their own 'universals') and perspective will follow. (The other sequence is simply religion.)
* See Hill, 'Solidarity, Objectivity, and the Human Form of Life,'Critical Review 11: 4 (Fall 1997) 1998, pp. 555-80.** See Greenspan, 'Market Capitalism: The Role of Free Markets,' Vital Speeches of the Day, 1 May 1998, pp. 418-21.
*** See C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination (Oxford University Press, 1959), chapter 8, section 5.
Notes:
1. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Blackwell, 1958), § 206.
2. Ibid., § 154.
3. Skinner, About Behaviorism (Knopf, 1974), p. 105.
