Barry (prior): :
If 'universal values' are contingent upon a 'dissolution of a class society,' then it is doubtful that such values are truly universal.: ...I would suggest that such values emerge as a result of (or simultaneously with) the development of a class consciousness.
Then you may wish to acknowledge that each class shall perceive (and describe) values within the context of their class. This can only create values for each class, for each perspective; such values must differ to the extent that each class experiences different things (creating different perspectives) predicated upon their different forms of life (unskilled labor, skilled labor, and so on). Each class is reinforced by different things (and to different degrees; and on different schedules); if reinforcement, as I believe, determines values, then there cannot be a 'universal' value (because there is no universal reinforcement). To put it in Marxian terms, class struggle (not to mention the very concept of a dialectic) demonstrates disparate values. Better yet, Wittgenstein: 'The fluctuation of scientific definitions: what today counts as an observed concomitant of a phenomenon will tomorrow be used to define it.'(1)
: Feudal society contained strata that its populations accepted as "divinely'' ordained. Occasionally a Spartacus will arise to challenge the prevailing order...Such questioning implies (at least to me) a sense of fairness (or un-fairness)...These changes in perception may be the result of particular "contingencies of reinforcement" - but why should such "contingencies" be concerned with "rights" to begin with?
This is a worthy distinction. What would be the use of replacing 'fairness' with 'contingency' (as you anticipated I would)? Essentially because contingency (the idea, not the word) is much more flexible (yet specific) than 'fairness.' Imagine you work for X who employs you to produce Y. For $2 an hour, it is exploitation (you quit); for $20 an hour it is the best job you've had in years (you work). The contingencies have changed with the wage change; whether or not the job was 'fair' or 'unfair' did not need to be addressed. Back to your example, Spartacus. Whether or not his 'job' was 'fair' was determined by the contingencies that either reinforced or failed to reinforce his behavior; there was no need to fall back upon 'philosophical' (grammatical---since grammar is context) discussions---which is useful because the slave owners would have said Spartacus' job (lot in life) was fair while Spartacus would have disagreed. Since the reinforcing contingencies failed to sustain Spartacus' behavior we know they were 'unfair' (instead of making the determination in words). Using this explanatory rigor, we need not enter into semantics about 'rights,' we simply go to the field of behavior to witness what is or what isn't (behavior itself). We're not concerned with 'rights' because they frequently defy definition; behavior, however, is verifiable, solid.
Skinner: 'For thousands of years employers had used various schedules of reinforcement, but that fact could scarcely have affected the analysis of schedules in the laboratory, where the rat or pigeon (free of ideology) told the story rather than the scientist.'(2) (My emphasis)
Barry (prior): :
Contingencies, for me, do not need the sanction of 'human nature' any more than they need the sanction of a 'higher authority' (which I believe is what 'human nature' represents today).
: Well…maybe lower authority.
Well put.
: Such influences can and are overridden by culture in any case.
Yes. Schwartz: 'Culture has, in effect, made evolution obsolete.'(3)
: (Of course I would have phrased it differently - "Reinforcing contingencies permitted my 'fairness gene' to express itself") :)
That is a phrase I think we can both live with.
: To seek "freedom from such reliance altogether" may be a Faustian task.
Freedom from ideology might well be...(worth the effort)
: James Alcock published an article some years ago that neatly described some of the brains evolutionary functions when it comes to formulating beliefs. Perhaps I'll post some of it.
Please do.
Notes:
1. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (Blackwell, 1958), § 79.
2. Skinner, A Matter of Consequences (Knopf, 1983), p. 361.
3. Schwartz, The Battle For Human Nature (Norton, 1986), p. 195.
None.
