H&P, you asked: "It's not common sense because your not a plant, at least i don't think so. If you aren't or have never been a plant then you can't know it doesn't feel or think. To me it is the same thing because i get pleasure out of hunting my food-yup i sayed it, like i have sayed before that isn't the only reason. I am sure that a vegitarian who grows his own food in a garden probably gets joy out of growing food then they kill a plant and eat it. Plants and animals may not be exactly the same but the concepts are-to me at least."This is a question we vegetarians are frequently asked. Here is a good set of answers, but be forewarned, it's kind of long:
Question: Isn't it hypocritical to kill and eat plants?
Answer: It would be hypocritical IF the same criteria or morally relevant attributes that are used to justify animal rights also applied to plants. The criteria cited by the AR movement are "pain and suffering" and being "subjects-of-a-life". An assessment of how plants measure up to these criteria leads to the following conclusions.
First, our best science to date shows that plants lack any semblance
of a central nervous system or any other system design for such complex
capacities as that of conscious suffering from felt pain.
Second, plants simply have no evolutionary need to feel pain. Animals
being mobile would benefit from the ability to sense pain; plants would
not. Nature does not gratuitously create such complex capacities as that of feeling pain unless there is some benefit for the organism's
survival.
Question: But how can you prove that plants don't feel pain?
Answer: Lest we forget the ultimate point of what follows, let us not forget the central thesis of AR. Simply stated: to the extent other animals share with us certain morally relevant attributes, then to that extent we confer upon them due regard and concern. The two attributes that are arguably relevant are: a) our capacity for pain and suffering, and b) the capacity for being the "subject-of-a-life", i.e., being such that it matters to one whether one's life fares well or ill.
Both of these qualities require the existence of mental states. Also
note that in order to speak of "mental states" proper, we would denote,
so common usage would dictate, that such states are marked by consciousness. It is insufficient to mark off mental states by only the apparent presence of purposefulness or intentionality since, as we shall see below, many material objects possess purposeful-looking behaviors.
So then, how do we properly attribute the existence of mental states to
other animals, or even to ourselves for that matter? We cannot infer presence of felt pain simply by the presence of a class of behaviors that are functional for an organism's amelioration or avoidance of noxious stimuli. Thermostats obviously react to thermal changes in the environment and respond in a functionally appropriate manner to restore an initial "preferred" state. We would be foolish, however, to attribute to thermostats a capability to "sense" or "feel" some kind of thermal "pain". Even placing quotes around our terms doesn't protect us from absurdity. Clearly, the behavioral criterion of even functional avoidance/defense reactions is simply not sufficient nor even necessary for the proper attribution of pain as a felt mental state.
Science, including the biological sciences, are committed to the working assumption of scientific materialism or physicalism (see "The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science", E. A. Burtt, 1924). We must then start with the generally accepted scientific assumption that matter is the only existent or real primordial constituent of the universe.
Let it be said at the outset that scientific materialism as such does
not preclude the existence of emergent or functional qualities like that of mind, consciousness, and feeling (or even, dare I say it, free will), but all such qualities are dependent upon the existence of organized matter. If there is no hardware, there is nothing for the software to run on. If there is no intact, living brain, there is no mind. It should also be said that even contemporary versions of dualism or mind-stuff theories will also make embodiment of mental states dependent on the presence of sufficiently organized matter.
To briefly state the case, cognitive functions like consciousness and
mind are seen as emergent properties of sufficiently organized matter.
Just as breathing is a function of a complex system of organs referred to as the respiratory system, so too is consciousness a function of the
immensely complex information-processing capabilities of a central nervous system. It is possible, in theory, that future computers, given a sufficiently complex and orderly organization of hardware and clever
software, could exhibit the requisite emergent qualities. While such
computers do not exist, we DO know that certain living organisms on planet possess the requisite complexity of specialized and highly
organized structure for the emergence of mental states. In theory, plants could possess a mental state like pain, but if, and only if, there were a requisite complexity of organized plant tissue that could serve to instantiate the higher order mental states of consciousness and felt pain.
There is no morphological evidence that such a complexity of tissue
exists in plants. Plants lack the specialized structures required for
emergence of mental states. This is not to say that they cannot exhibit
complex reactions, but we are simply over-interpreting such reactions if we designate them as "felt pain".
With respect to all mammals, birds, and reptiles, we know that they
possess a sufficiently complex neural structure to enable felt pain plus an evolutionary need for such consciously felt states. They possess complex and specialized sense organs, they possess complex and specialized structures for processing information and for centrally orchestrating appropriate behaviors in accordance with mental representations, integrations, and reorganizations of that information. The proper attribution of felt pain in these animals is well justified. It is not for plants, by any stretch of the imagination.
The absurdity (and often disingenuity) of the plant-pain promoters can be easily exposed by asking them the following two questions:
1) Do you agree that animals like dogs and cats should receive
pain-killing drugs prior to surgery?
2) Do you believe that plants should receive pain-killing drugs
prior to pruning?
Question: Aren't there studies that show that plants can scream, etc.?
How can something without vocal apparatus scream? Perhaps the questioner intends to suggest that plants somehow express feelings or emotions. This notion is popularized in the book "The Secret Life of Plants", by Tompkins and Bird, 1972. The book describes "experiments" in which plants are claimed to respond to injury and even to the thoughts and emotions of nearby humans. The responses consist of changes in the electrical conductivity of their leaves. The truth is, however, that nothing but a dismal failure has resulted from attempts to replicate these experiments. For some definitive reviews, see Science, 1975, 189:478 and The Skeptical Inquirer, 1978, 2(2):57.
But what about plant responses to insect invasion? Does this suggest
that plants "feel" pain? No published book or paper in a scientific
journal has been cited as indeed making this claim that "plants feel
pain". There is interesting data suggesting that plants react to local
tissue damage and even emit signaling molecules serving to stimulate
chemical defenses of nearby plants. But how is this relevant to the claim that plants feel and suffer from pain? Where are the replicated
experiments and peer-reviewed citations for this putative fact? There are none.
Let us, for the sake of argument, consider the form of logic employed by the plant-pain promoters: premise 1: Plants are responsive to "sense" impressions. Premise 2: As defined in the dictionary, anything
responsive to sense impressions is sentient. Conclusion 1: Plants are sentient. Premise 3: Sentient beings are conscious of sense impressions. Conclusion 2: Plants are conscious of sense impressions.
Premise 4: To be conscious of a noxious stimuli is unpleasant.
Conclusion 3: Noxious stimuli to plants are unpleasant, i.e., painful.
There is a major logical sleight-of-hand here. The meaning of the term
"sentient" changes between premise 2 ("responsive to sense impressions")and premise 3 ("conscious of sense impressions"). Thus, equivocation on the usage of "sentient" is used to bootleg the false conclusion 3. There is also an equivocation on the meaning of "painful" ("unpleasant" versus the commonly understood meaning).
If we can bring ourselves to momentarily assume (falsely) that plants
feel pain, then we can easily argue that by eliminating animal farming,
we reduce the total pain inflicted on plants, leading to the ironic
conclusion that plant pain supports the Animal Rights position.
Question: But even if plants don't feel pain, aren't you depriving
them of their life? Why isn't that enough to accord moral status to
plants?
Answer: The philosophy of Animal Rights is generally regarded as encompassing only sentient creatures. Plants are just one of many non-sentient, living creatures. To remain consistent, granting moral status to plants would lead one to grant it to all life. It may be thought that a philosophy encompassing all life would be best, but granting moral status to all living creatures leads to rather implausible views.
For example, concern for life would lead one to oppose the distribution
of spermicides, even to overpopulated Third world countries. The morality of any sexual intercourse could be questioned as well, since thousands of sperm cells die in each act. Also, the sheer variety of life forms creates difficulties; for example, arguments have been made to show that some computer programs--such as computer viruses--may well be called alive. Should one grant them moral status?
There are questions even in the case of plants. The use of weed-killers
in a garden would need defending. And if killing plants is wrong, why
isn't merely damaging them in some other way also wrong? Is trimming
hedgerows wrong?
The problems raised above are not attempts to discourage efforts to
develop an ethics of the environment. They simply point out that according moral status to all living creatures is fraught with difficulties. Nevertheless, some people do, indeed, argue that the taking of life should be minimized where possible; this constitutes a kind of moral status for life.
