<"Here we can see that not only was RD's response predicted---it was also 'controlled.' However, no one 'forced' RD to respond to my post 'Getting Marxism Wrong.' He was not coerced or manipulated in any way---or, at least, not in any way that resembles the totalitarian methods he has intimated behaviorism supports. He simply emitted behavior once certain establishing operations (environmental circumstances) that have led to his behavior being emitted (reinforced) in the past were again in place. He might even say that he 'chose' to respond to a post. This is operant conditioning---the concept of selection by consequence that RD has, variously, claimed: (1) could not control human behavior, (2) could lead to 'totalitarian' control, or (3) was 'nebulous' (post 3392)."
-----Well, an observation. Two or three really.
The first would be broadness of interpretation. That is, an agreed recognition that it's possible to describe nearly all social behavior in terms of response to a given stimulus (or reinforcement contingency). Virtually any act can be 'explained' by an antecedent 'contingency'. It can be so broad as to incorporate features (which you would object to I'm sure) such as various 'mentalisms' as Freudians might employ for their own interpretations of 'contingencies'. So, for example, positing that individual "X' has an "Oedipal complex", would suggest that approaching that person in an authoritative manner, would result in a confrontational response.
The second is the nearly inescapable sensation that regardless of the mechanism of operant conditioning, there must remain the perception if not the actuality of manipulation. You chose not to describe the 'reinforcing' aspects of your own felt necessity to engage RD in these 'exchanges'. Presumably to do so would seem irrelevant to your points. But in fact, your points derive their strength precisely to the degree that you are able to demonstrate how behavior can, in fact, be manipulated even though the recipient is either unaware, or in fact is convinced that he or she has made a 'free' choice. It might be argued that as long as the person <1>feels that he or she is operating as a free agent, that is all that is required. This might do for training horses but not for human beings, who if rationality is to have play in human decision making, require that ALL relevant information be made available for decision making. Such relevant information would include laying out the intent and purposes of proposed "operants" (truth in advertising).
Naturally if I wish to convince people of the benefits (and necessity) of a socialist form of governance, I will be utilizing one or another 'technique' that could be incorporated into the behaviorist jargon. Also it is fair to note the difference between 'aversive' conditioning - (Stalinist coercion or Orwell's 1984) and operant conditioning as manifested by the modern (and post-modern) consumer culture of the Spectacle a la Debord or Huxley's Brave New World. These two generators of behavior - Fear and Desire are highly utilized.
It would be nice to think that reason would prevail and serve as a motivator when discussing such things as for example global warming. But it may ultimately rest on one of the above two 'motivators'. For example, Fiji is so far the only country in the world that has signed onto and ratified the Kyoto Convention's protocols on the environment and global warming. Nothing like the fear of a high tide and questions of survival. The concluding question: Is there a 'reasonable' or rational basis for reason unmitigated by underlying emotional qualifiers? Now if I understand you, you would maintain that the emotion IS the behavior in that it was the result of previous contingencies. But regardless of where we think origins lie, it seems hard to deny the effect of: sadness, delight, boredom, anger, fear, desire, love, jealousy or anxiety on our decision making. We could probably extend the list by a dozen or so and then arrange them in a kind of hierarchy of "good" or comfortable feelings to "bad" or uncomfortable ones. We might find that the typical emotional responses to the particular events that engendered these feelings were remarkably consistent with behavior that was evolutionarily beneficial to species survival - having little relevance to 'rationality'.
bill
