: ...I feel that "survival value" is a little too general a parameter upon which to base paradigms. There are probably many totalitarian structures that could guarantee ecologically sound survival values. Our main philosophic difference here seems to be one of approach... But I seek a grounding in a biological human condition - hence my interest in "fairness genes" and evolutionary psychology.A valid perspective and well stated. Survival value, although compelling in general, certainly lacks specificity. I see this as a strength of behavior theory, however, anticipating cultural relativism by several years. Totalitarian structures have, I believe, demonstrated their marked inability to sustain themselves (in the long run), and their failures can be behaviorally accounted for by applying Skinner's principle that punishment (aversive control) does not eliminate (probability of) behavior, it merely reinforces incompatible behavior (and only as long as punishment is applied), some of which engenders countercontrol.* It should be added that survival value as Skinner uses the term certainly has a cultural component in the behaviorist paradigm (hence its similarities to historical materialism). It is this cultural relativism that greets the notions of such absolutes as 'fairness genes' and 'human nature' with skepticism...**
: How we express a feeling is sometimes taught. Crying, for example, does not need to be taught, nor is it socially determined.
Crying does not need to be taught but its context does. Children cry, but often they do not know why, as they do not yet possess the language to describe their own internal stimuli and stimuli provided by contact with the environment. The language is provided by a verbal community that attaches context to crying---'oh, you must be hungry,' 'oh, you just fell,' etc. Often the relation between crying and variables are immediate and obvious (a fall, crying), often not (loneliness, crying---with other variables intervening, such as something that 'reminds' a person of their loneliness, say, a sentimental poem that, under most other circumstances, would never produce tears). We cry unaided by the environment, certainly; the expression of it, the understanding of it, however, is culturally understood (hence influenced)---thus the disapprobation regarding those who cry 'for no reason.'
: : A stomach ache could cause a 'bad mood,' a long bout of stomach problems could cause 'depression.' That is still not to say that a bad mood creates the bad mood, or that depression causes depression. Again: feelings are effects of behavior (and behavioral contact with environments), not causes.
: Here is where I have trouble. I believe that feelings are the Cause of much (if not all)
behavior. A feeling may be how we experience a particular electro-chemical state. A particular behavior may inhibit or enhance that state. This is not the same thing as saying "a bad mood creates a bad mood" . What I'm suggesting is that feelings are generated by behavior, AND, behavior is generated by feelings.
I would restate that by saying that behavior is the cause of much (certainly not all***) feelings. 'It is easy to mistake what we feel as a cause because we feel it while we are behaving (or even before we behave), but the events which are actually responsible for what we do (and hence what we feel) lie in the possibly remote past.'(1) What I appreciate is your observation that the process, so to speak, is continual: there is a cause for feeling, acknowledgement of it, interpretation of it, and then a response (that most likely will affect not the feeling but the cause of the feeling). I understand you as saying something to the effect as to: certain feelings engender increased or decreased probabilities of responding in certain ways. Each one of our feelings (even generalized ones that we don't actually have direct contact with, but recall) has a genesis in the environment (an environment that includes our behavioral interaction), however; because of prior contacts with the environment we have the feelings that 'inhibit or enhance' our 'state' when we confront future contacts.
: : : The problem as I see it is that by denying the existence of such "internal" functions, we may be attempting to elicit (through reinforcement techniques, laws, etc.) certain "normative" behaviors.
: Perhaps I can get to it from another direction. The value we place on certain specific
behavior may be either encouraged or discouraged by a culture. A particular behavioral response is not necessarily indicative of a particular feeling. In other words, the same externally manifested behavior in different cultures, does not necessarily indicate similar internal states.
Yes. Certain 'feelings' are culturally engineered---by reinforcing, non-reinforcing, or aversive contingencies. All 'feelings' have context (and some context is genetic).
: For example, last year there were over a thousand suicides in Japan. According to some investigation (I don't remember the source) upwards of 80% of these had some connection with debt or business failure. The emotional consideration leading to this unhappy occurrence was reported to have been "shame". This is a complex inner state very much dependent on how much importance one places on perceptions (or projections) of the "other".
The 'emotional consideration,' 'shame' did not 'lead' to the suicides in my opinion (the 'emotional consideration' is but a synonym for 'shame'); what led to the suicides were the strong punitive responses that Japanese society metes out to those who become bankrupt. Such strong punitive responses (filial censure, for example) need not be direct. Enough conditioning (pairing with primary reinforcement) will become discriminative stimuli (say, 'shame') for the punitive contingencies (say, filial censure)---so that the punished individual will punish him- or herself in the absence of primary reinforcement (say, the absence of the family actually knowing about the bankruptcy).**** Remember, aversive contingencies may operate on variable schedules (as positive ones will), thus only a few direct contacts with the independent variables will control unmediated behavior for a relatively long time.
: Now there is no question that a good deal of social cohesiveness (conformity) can be achieved by inculcating behavior that, were one to deviate, would produce ridicule, derision, or outrage. The shame that results is an internal emotion in response not to the behavior qua behavior, but to the projected interpretation of what that behavior (perhaps nothing more than an imagined scowl) represents, ie, the feeling of being despised. (In other words, an external state (behavior) is sought by manipulation of an internal state (feelings. For the culture - Behavior and the external are primary. The "internal state", for the Cultural Designer (king or congress) become secondary, important only to the extent they serve the primary purpose of socially accepted behavior.
I follow your point. Various societies determine various feelings because various behaviors are either reinforced or not. This is not 'the case' of behaviorism per se, this is the reality of all social, religious, and governmental controls...
: So what does this have to do with utopian design? Only that smiling faces (or any
behavior a particular culture might wish to inculcate or reinforce) is not necessarily an
indicator of a particular inner state. This is not to say external conditions aren't important. On the contrary, they are crucial.
Why would we smile if we are not happy? Nye on the subject:
Reaction formation is a [Freudian] defense mechanism that involves doing the opposite (often to an extreme) of what is unconsciously felt or thought. For example, unconscious resentment of a friend may be replaced with exaggerated displays of affection, or hidden sexual impulses may be covered up with exaggerated concern about morality. The ego attempts to protect against the anxiety that would result if the real feelings came to the surface. In Skinner's view, however, people respond to environmental circumstances, and it isn't necessary to bring in the concept of the ego using a 'reaction formation.' Basically, the individual will behave in ways that reduce the chances of being punished.(2)
Which brings us back to countercontrol. And the potential of behaviorism to design a society where punishment is superannuated---and no one ever does what he or she does not want to do (for fear of punitive measures). Is the aim of behaviorism to determine certain 'normative' behaviors (as you put it)? Of course. And socialism has the same aim (although to admit this might scare off some anarchist recruits). What behaviorism offers traditional socialists is a science that can make punishment obsolete (and this is good news for everyone).
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* 'Because of the aversive consequences of being controlled, the individual who undertakes to control other people is likely to be countercontrolled by all of them...The opposition to control is likely to be directed toward the most objectionable forms---the use of force and conspicuous instances of exploitation, undue influence, or gross misrepresentation---but it may extend to any control which is "deliberately" exerted because of the consequences to the controller.' (Skinner, Science and Human Behavior, Macmillan, 1953, pp. 321-22.) As Skinner points out later in that book, specifically addressing governmental control, the more aversive control becomes, the more probable countercontrol becomes. The solution, as he saw it, was the development of non-aversive control (positive reinforcement) in 'governance,' a form of control that does not engender countercontrol. (Ibid, p. 348.)** 'The belief in instincts and in inheritance of mental traits in man has been strengthened in the popular view by the propaganda of the eugenists. They have made many observations upon gifted families and they conclude from their findings that "talent" does run in families---that such things as mathematical ability, musical ability, and artistic and literary ability are handed down from parents to children. They go further and hold out the hopes that by intermarriage of the gifted we can finally build a race of Nietzscheans---only these supermen and superwomen will be bred for art, industry, and science, and not for war. This view of the eugenist will ultimately tamper with the mating of men and women and is far more dangerous than bolshevism.' (Watson, The Ways of Behaviorism, Harper & Bros., 1928, pp. 25-26.) Consider the possibility that eugenic theories will again emerge with the 'mapping' (and patenting) of genes in up-coming years...
*** Returning to an old example, a toothache is obviously not a behavior, but neither is it a feeling (it is gum decay, abscess, etc.).
**** A discriminative stimulus (say the presence of a green light when food is obtainable when certain responses are emitted) can become a secondary reinforcer (doing whatever creates the state of such a stimulus becomes itself reinforcing). Secondary reinforcers are also easily generalized with other (primarily) reinforcing things or acts. Hence: '[O]nce established, a secondary reinforcement can strengthen other responses than that used during its original establishment, and so do so under other motives than that prevailing during the original training.' (Keller & Schoenfeld, Principles of Psychology, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950, p. 241.) K & S hasten to add that such secondary 'associations' can not exist indefinitely, however, in all absence of primarily reinforcing criteria...
Notes:
1. Skinner, 'The Place of Feeling in the Analysis of Behavior,' Recent Issues in the Analysis of Behavior (Merrill, 1989), p. 5.
2. Nye, The Legacy of B.F. Skinner, (Brooks/Cole, 1992), p. 83.
None.
