: The somewhat utopian vision of unconditional freedom, spontaneity, creativity, and social solidarity are presumed to be part of some essential "essence" of mankind as a species.Sorry, I was under the impression that the classic 19th century utopias (and practicing socialist communities) were characterized by elaborate rules---not 'unconditional freedom, spontaneity, creativity, etc.' (Owen, Fourier, Collins [Skaneatles Community], Noyes, etc.) Those rules often served to displace what was considered an unhealthy 'human nature' with 'reason,' much in the manner that religions codify circumscriptions upon behavior. With the salient exception of Owen (who, as the first behaviorist, did not acknowledge 'human nature'), the utopians of the 19th century, although attempting to change 'human nature' through social programming (milieu), believed strongly in biological determination.
: The developing field of evolutionary psychology assumes that there is a human nature and that it is expressed through evolved psychological mechanisms and that these mechanisms are the result of selective adaptations to environment - most of which evolved during the hunter-gathering millennia of several million years of human history. These mechanisms are held to be universal and are part of our genetic heritage.
The (recidivist) return of 'human nature' and 'universal genetic mechanisms' that continue to be informed by hunter-gatherer 'instincts' demonstrate the reactionary influence upon university and scientific financing in these dire days of unchecked privatization. 'Selfish gene' theory, fitness maximization, natural selection (neglecting selection by consequence) are all the rage today. Life magazine recently cited a 'scientific' study that 'concluded that happiness is 80 percent heritable---it depends little on wealth, achievement or martial status.'(1)
At the risk of reducing a complex topic to a slogan, I would like to reiterate Skinner's assertion that all phylogenic contingencies of reinforcement (natural selection) must have first appeared as ontogenic contingencies of reinforcement (selection by consequence)---and were either shaped, reinforced, or extinguished by an environment that must have existed prior to the behavior it elicited.(2) What was selected by nature was and remains susceptible to ontogenic shaping. I say 'was' because (and this is the part that separates radical behaviorism from classical) as the animal that creates the culture it lives in, we shape our own behavior (and 'destiny') as a result of our impact upon our environment. (This is usually the point where talk of utopias come in...)
: At least for me, Marx's greatest contribution was his analysis of the mechanisms of alienation to be found within capitalism. That what we sometimes describe as concepts or values such as "co-operation" or "fairness" may in fact be part of an inherited "human nature" that has been deformed by a coercive social system. If this is the case, Marxism and the revolutionary ideal could have a truly scientific underpinning in the social sciences...
: One aspect that has been consistently ignored is the fear that man is by nature "brutish", "acquisitive", "selfish", etc. THE VERY FACT that these terms carry with them a negative sense IMPLIES a natural or inherent trait that places a positive value on values incorporating cooperation, "reciprocal altruism", and mutual aid as described by Kropotkin.
I would agree that cooperation has an equal claim upon 'human nature' as competition, and that such a distinction is useful when speaking to those who are adamant in their belief of 'human nature' (paradoxically, the same people who defend individual 'free will'). I do think, nonetheless, that 'human nature' is more trouble than it is worth (ideologically) and, considering human impact upon the social environment, 'human nature' ultimately fails to pay its way (empirically). Marx, following Hegel, proposed a teleological view of culture. Skinner was correct to identity this anthropological fixed order of stages as creationist---and to disregard it.(3)
This underscores a recurring (ideological) problem with 'human nature'---some authority is required to identify it (hence the reactionary use for it).
* * *
: It is pretty well accepted that there is what Chomsky terms a'Language Acquisition Device' [LAD] and that syntax and grammar are not "learned" through
positive reinforcement mechanisms, but are part of our mental architecture, cross-cultural and universal.
P.S. Chomsky got on the map attacking Skinner's Verbal Behavior (in 1959) with some thoughtful insights, but calling syntax and grammar 'part of our mental architecture' merely exchanges words that describe (verbal) contingencies with poetic metaphors that describe (verbal) contingencies with even less accuracy. 'Mental architecture' is shared (i.e. socialized) in order to be expressed, thus contingent upon the behavior of the listener...
As Wittgenstein put it:
'We do not say that possibly a dog talks to itself. Is that because we are so minutely acquainted with its soul? Well, one might say this: If one sees the behavior of a living thing, one sees its soul.---But do I also say in my own case that I am saying something to myself, because I am behaving in such-and-such a way?---I do not say it from observation of my behavior. But it only makes sense because I do behave in this way.' (Philosophical Investigations, Blackwell,1953, p. 113e.)
* * *
Very enjoyable to hear your opinions, Bill...
Sources:
1. G.H. Colt & A. Hollister, 'Were You Born That Way?,' Life, April 1998, p. 40.
2. Skinner, 'The Phylogeny and Ontogeny of Behavior,' Contingencies of Reinforcement: A Theoretical Analysis (Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), p. 177.
3. Skinner, 'Genes and Behavior,' Recent Issues in the Analysis of Behavior (Merrill, 1989), chapter V, p. 54.
