Senator Lugar Warns of Nuclear Threats in Russia
From: Y2KNEWSWIRE Wednesday, October 6, 1999
As Richard Grenier said a decade ago, Russia is Bangladesh with missiles.
Lugar outlines here what is being done to keep fingers off the nuclear triggers. The Russian
military is not ready for y2k.
There are still billions of y2k skeptics out there. But if y2k is nothing much, what is this all about?
Russian early warning operators may not be able to tell the difference between a peaceful rocket
and a military rocket from their computer screens. Russian early-warning capabilities continue to
deteriorate, and this deterioration will be compounded by the transition to the year 2000. Russian
Major General Dvorkin recently suggested that Y2K problems could lead to incorrect information
being transmitted, received, displayed, or complete early-warning system failures.
The continuous safe and secure storage of the Russian nuclear stockpile is the second area that
will be complicated by Y2K. Over the last six or seven months, the Department of Defense has
sought to engage its Russian counterparts on the nuclear warhead protection, control and
accounting systems. Early in the discussions, the Russian Ministry of Defense admitted that it
had not considered the impact Y2K could have on their systems.
Many believe that Soviet-designed reactors are immune to Y2K-generated problems because
they utilize older analog systems. This is incorrect. Digital overlays were installed to improve
performance, monitoring, and safety response and are susceptible to Y2K problems. If these
systems were to malfunction, operators could be blind to some reactor functions or receive
erroneous data that could lead to improper actions. In U.S. reactors, this would not pose a
problem because of built-in redundancy of our systems. Unfortunately, redundancy is not present
in most Soviet-designed plants.
This is from the USIA site, a government information agency aimed at foreign nations. It is run by
the Department of State.
The Y2K computer problem may disrupt many Russian strategic systems, said Sen. Richard Lugar
before the Senate Special Committee on the Year 2000 Technology Problem Sept. 28.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR BEFORE THE SENATE SPECIAL
COMMITTEE ON THE YEAR 2000 TECHNOLOGY PROBLEM SUBJECT -- Y2K AND RUSSIA: WHAT ARE
THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS AND FUTURE CONSEQUENCES
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 1999.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Dodd, members of the Committee, it is a pleasure to be here today. I
appreciate the opportunity to testify on U.S.- Russian cooperative activities in response to the
Y2K computer problem. Mr. Chairman, we do not know what is going to happen to Russian
computer systems when we pass into the millennium and neither do they; but, initial estimates
do not appear promising. In March, the American Chamber of Commerce in Russia pointed to a
study that paints a disturbing picture of the impact of Y2K in Russia. "Utilities will operate at 40%
of capacity for the first two months of 2000; transportation will be disrupted 80% of the time,
and telecommunications 50% of the time for a three-month period; hospitals will be forced to
treat only emergencies for at least two months; financial markets will be disrupted for 30 trading
days; and banks will be disrupted for 20 business days." Obviously these estimates are disturbing
and beg the question of whether similar problems will affect the Russian military and strategic
forces.
I am not here to push the panic button. In my visits to Russia and in briefings and conversations
with experts on these subjects, I have been convinced that the chances of an accidental missile
launch as a result of a Y2K problem are almost non-existent. But Y2K may cause other problems
in Russian strategic systems.
Experts agree that cooperation over the transition period needs to center on three specific
areas: early warning systems, nuclear weapon security, and nuclear power plants.
EARLY WARNING:
Our Department of Defense began discussing the potential impact of Y2K with Russian
counterparts in June 1998. These efforts culminated in an agreement to establish a Center for
Y2K Strategic Stability in Colorado Springs, Colorado. The center will ensure that, for the last
few weeks in December 1999 and the first weeks of January 2000, U.S. and Russian military
officers will sit side by side and monitor early- warning data generated by satellites observing
missile activity around the world in order to ensure that potential mishaps caused by Y2K do not
lead to strategic miscalculations and mistakes. Mr. Chairman, it is in the interests of the U.S. to
ensure that Russia understands the kinds of problems they may encounter with its strategic
systems so that there are no surprises or confusion on January 1. We want them to understand
that their problems are Y2K- related and not a result of U.S. hostile action for which they need
to respond. This requires consultation, awareness of potential Y2K failures, and training of key
personnel. This kind of cooperation is clearly of as much value to the U.S. as it is to the
Russians.
Russian early warning operators may not be able to tell the difference between a peaceful rocket
and a military rocket from their computer screens. Russian early-warning capabilities continue to
deteriorate, and this deterioration will be compounded by the transition to the year 2000. Russian
Major General Dvorkin recently suggested that Y2K problems could lead to incorrect information
being transmitted, received, displayed, or complete early-warning system failures. We should
heed these concerns. I am sure we remember the convulsions the Russian command and control
system endured several years ago when a peaceful Norwegian rocket launch activated President
Yeltsin's nuclear briefcase. Fortunately, the Russians realized their mistake. The Center in
Colorado is meant to create an atmosphere for both sides to work together to resolve any missile
launch detection, false alarms, or other ambiguities that may arise. I am hopeful that the Russian
military officers serving on the second floor of building 1840 at Peterson Air Force Base will, in
the event of a Russian malfunction, be able to provide Moscow with the accurate information and
data necessary to eliminate misperceptions.
NUCLEAR STOCKPILE SECURITY:
The continuous safe and secure storage of the Russian nuclear stockpile is the second area that
will be complicated by Y2K. Over the last six or seven months, the Department of Defense has
sought to engage its Russian counterparts on the nuclear warhead protection, control and
accounting systems. Early in the discussions, the Russian Ministry of Defense admitted that it
had not considered the impact Y2K could have on their systems. The need for U.S. assistance in
this area is clear. As members of the Senate, we all have had countless briefings on the groups
and individuals attempting to illicitly acquire these weapons.
More recently the Russians have made substantial progress in acknowledging and responding to
these potential problems. . . . At Pentagon urging, the Russians have conducted capability
assessments to gauge their ability to respond to an emergency. Unfortunately, the results of the
assessments were not encouraging. Due to the lack of appropriate response equipment, it is
clear that there are significant deficiencies in their capabilities to respond to intrusions and other
potential threats. Our Defense Department is seeking to assist Russia in these efforts through
the Nunn-Lugar program.
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS:
The potential threats emanating from Y2K problems in Soviet-designed nuclear reactors is a third
area of concern. Historically, safety mechanisms and procedures at these reactors are poor. The
reactors suffer from deficiencies in design, operator training, and safety procedures. Reactor
operators and support staff face low and erratic pay, training shortfalls, and deficiencies in
safety procedures. Unfortunately, these problems are compounded by a very late start in
preparing for the transition to the new millennium by the states of the former Soviet Union and
Central and Eastern Europe. Although neither a melt-down or a failure of primary safety systems
is likely, it is in our interests to continue to work to prevent these potential threats.
None.
