Gideon, i noticed you were relying heavily on Sir Karl, so i post this refutation of Sir Karl for your consideration. Apologies for thge lack of references, but i was fairly rushed!------
Sir Karl?s central claim was that science does not in fact rest on induction. Scientists do not start with observations and infer a general theory. Rather they put forward a theory (he calls it an uncorobarated conjecture) and compare its predictions with observations to see if it stands up. If it doesn't stand up, the theory is negated (falsified). If the observation does not refute the theory it will stand as an undefeated conjecture.
(If we look at science tis way, we do not need induction. The inferences that matter are refutations-and these take a deductive form.)
So Popper argues that science is a series of conjectures and refutations. Scientific theories are put forward as hypotheses and replaced by new hypotheses when falsified.
But there is a problem here. If science theories are alwyas conjuctural then what makes them better than unwarranted superstition? A non-Popperian can say that science proves its claims via observational evidence. A Popperian on the other hand has no way of showing a scientific theory true- as such they too are guesswork they cannot be proved by observation but are just unrefuted conjectures.
Popper had an answer to this objection. Namely that science contra superstition is falsifiable, even if not proveable. Scientific theory has precise terms and testable predictions, whereas non-science tends to be vague and not easily subject to testing. Popper uses the falsificationism as the criterion to draw a line between science and pseudo science (He callos it ?the problem of demarcation?). Thus he says astrology psychoanalysis etc. are not falsifiable and hence are not science.
PROBLEMS FOR SIR KARL
The central objection to be raised against Popper is that his theory of science accounts only for negative knowledge. He provides no way to show a theory is true and hence there is no way to gain positive knowledge.
But positive knowledge is supposed to follow from induction (THIS is the important distinction between induction and deduction, induction priovides us with new knowledge about the world). Indeed it is this positive knowledge that makes induction important. Our ability to send people to the moon, to make computers, etc is because we *know* that certain causes have certain results. Popper does not explain how we might know 'All As are Bs' just that it is false that 'All As are Bs' thus he fails to deal properly with the problem of induction.
Essentially the problem of induction is how we can base judgments about the future on evidence about the past. To say that scientific theories are just conjectures is to say that we have no rational basis for believing their predictions.
i.e. Popper denies we can make rational judgments about the future.
-Consider: A) I jump out of a plane without my oarachute and i shall fall to my death
B) When i jump out of the plane without my parachute i shall fly like a bird.
Clearly it is more rational to believe A), which assumes future like past. But as Popper rejects induction he holds that past evidence does not makes beliefs about the future more rational than any others and thus B is no less rational than A.
But of course believing A is more rational than believing B (this is why induction is a problem). Problem is to showe why beleiving A is more rational than believing B when induction is not logically compelling. Popper's denial of rational superiority of A over B connotes his failure to recognise that there is in fact a problem with induction.
