[snip]: :You lost me there. Let me see if I understood you correctly. I believe you're saying that the attempt (to prove that science is the only source of knowledge) is not science, and therefore can not be successful. IOW, the attempt is not science, so if it is true, it can not be proven, whereas if it can be proven, it is, by definition, false, since it is a non-scientific proof. Is that what you were saying? That would be a considerable paradox! However, I'm not arguing that science is the only source of knowledge. Rather, I'm arguing that it is the only way we can make meaningful statements about the physical world, and therefore the only way to make statements that we can apply to the material world.
: So we have other sources of knowledge? Ok then if we take the socratic formulation of knowledge (accepted i believe by most although problematic due to the gettier counterexamples), then knowledge consists of justified true belief. One way of justifying a belief is through scientific experientation.
: Now, as you believe in sources of knowledge other than science, it follows that you must find acceptable sources of justification other than science. Yes?
I guess I wasn't clear. To reiterate, I'm willing to accept, for the sake of argument, that other sources of "knowledge" exist, (e.g. "revelations," hallucinations, dreams, etc. as "ways of knowing,") but I think you're putting words in my mouth when you suggest that I "believe in" other sources. The difference here, I think, is that I'm willing to accept that "Gotch" and his ilk "know" that they're right, and no amount of material evidence will serve to convince them. Therefore, their odd superstitions (Gotch's version is not even very Christian, IMHO) can be viewed as a source of "knowledge," insofar as they believe that their beliefs are justified and true. There is a lurking "Von Neuman's catastrophe" (what some philosophers call the K-K problem) in this type of belief however. "I know x is true, because I believe it, and I believe it because it's true." Do they actually have "knowledge," by Socrates' definition? I'm not sure, frankly, because their belief rests entirely on itself; it is self-justifying, and assumed to be true based on the strength of the belief, rather than on supporting evidence. Does that satisfy the Socratic definition of knowledge? If so, then ok, I believe that there are other sources of knowledge, that is, I believe they exist, but I wouldn't go so far as to say I believe these sources of knowledge, per se. It's sort of like A) "I believe a form of state socialism exists in China" is not the same as B) "I believe in the goodness and validity of the Chinese model of state socialism." Sentance A, for me, is true, sentance B is, in my case, false. However, both sentances could be written C) "I believe in the Chinese form of state socialism." If, by that, I was implying version A, it would be a justified, true belief, and therefore knowledge, sensu stricto. However, I would have no control over whether you interpreted C as meaning A or B, since both are possible implications, so you might interpret C as meaning B, and assume, mistakenly, that I was a Chinese style socialist. You would even have evidence to support this belief, in the form of sentance C. Would you, then, have "knowledge?" In other words, if I said C, yould you "know" that B was true? You would have justification, in the form of my sentance, for thinking so, would you not? See, if you interpret C as meaning B, then you'll "know" something that isn't true (that is, the time-space even "me" is not actually a supporter of state socialism, although the semantic event, "me" saying sentance C might make it appear that way.)
So, if you interpret C as meaning B, do you have knowledge? If so, then, yes, I believe other sources of knowledge exist. If not, then no, I don't believe it. It's a question of how important "true" is in your definition of knowledge, and what you mean by "true," I suppose. I hope I was more clear that time.
-Floyd
